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NOTES & COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES AND
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
During the past ten years, the assessment of dollar fines for viola-
tions of federal regulations has become the most popular sanction
utilized by administrative agencies to enforce their regulatory
schemes.' The use of these fines,2 termed civil money penalties, 3 has
The amount of civil money penalties collected by federal agencies nearly dou-
bled from 5.8 million dollars in 1967 to 10.5 million dollars in 1971. Additionally, it
was estimated that the 1971 figure would probably triple within a few years. Gold-
schmid, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a
Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, 2 RECOMMENDATIONS & REPORTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 896, 903, 905 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Goldschmidl.
2 The money penalty is but one of many sanctions available to administrative
agencies for enforcing their regulations. For a discussion of other enforcement tech-
niques see Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970
WASH. U. L. Q. 265; McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49
IOWA L. REV. 441 (1964) [hereinafter cited as McKay, 49 IowA L. REV. 441 (1964)];
Murphy, Money Penalties- -An Administrative Sword of Damocles, 2 SANTA CLARA
LAWYER 113 (1962).
A money penalty may be either criminal or civil. To determine whether a sanc-
tion is civil or criminal, courts generally consider the purpose of the sanction-if it is
primarily remedial it is considered civil, if it is primarily punitive it is considered
criminal. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); United States ex
rel. Marens v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). However, in an administrative proceeding
money penalties are considered civil because an agency may not impose criminal
sanctions. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.13 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS]; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 109-15 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as JAFFE]; 1 T. VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 81 (Supp.
1947). To avoid an improper delegation of the judicial authority to decide criminal
actions, Congress merely labels money penalties assessed by administrative agencies
as "civil," and the courts generally accept this congressional characterization. See
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103
(1909); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975); Goldschmid, supra
note 1, at part C, 913-16; Comment, The Imposition of Administrative Penalties and
the Right to Trial by Jury-An Unheralded Expansion of Criminal Law?, 65 J. CRIM.
L. & C. 345, 351-53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 345
(1974)].
Several commentators have criticized the courts' ready acceptance of administra-
tive money penalties as "civil" merely because Congress has so designated the penal-
ties. The commentators assert that the courts have failed fully to analyze the nature
of the penalties and that, therefore, a defendant is deprived of constitutional rights
guaranteed to one accused of a crime. See Charney, The Need for Constitutional
Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974);
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increased primarily because they are administratively advantageous.
They affect only the wrongdoer; they are flexible, thereby enhancing
an agency's ability to achieve its statutory goals; and they are less
severe than other administrative sanctions, such as license revoca-
tion.' In one regulatory framework, however, the assessment of civil
money penalties raises the issue whether the individual fined has a
seventh amendment right to a jury trial.5
Six administrative agencies have the power to impose civil money
penalties through a regulatory framework which does not provide for
jury trial.' The seventh amendment right is unavailable because the
McKay, 49 IowA L. REV. 441 (1964), supra note 2 at 443-45; Comment, 65 J. CmM.
L. & C. 345 (1974), supra. Comment, OSHA Penalties, Some Constitutional Con-
siderations, 10 IDAHO L. Rav. 223 (1974). One commentator, however, favors the use
of civil money penalties by administrative agencies. He emphasizes that an important
function of the money penalties is to punish individuals for, and deter other individuals
from, violating administrative regulations. He concludes that money penalties desig-
nated as civil by Congress will be accepted by the courts if the penalties: "(1) are
rationally related to a regulatory (or revenue collecting) scheme; (2) do not deal with
offenses which are mala in se ... ; [and] (3) may be expected to have a prophylactic
or remedial effect." Goldschmid, supra note 1, at 914 (footnotes omitted).
Goldschmid, supra note 1, at 910-11.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII provides:
"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... "
The sixth amendment and article M, § 2 of the United States Constitution guar-
antee the right to jury trial in criminal actions. See authorities cited in note 3, supra,
for discussion of the possible application of the sixth amendment and article III, § 2
to civil money penalties.
6 These six agencies are: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2) the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, (3) the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, (4) the United States Postal Service, (5) the Department of the Interior, and
(6) the Department of Labor.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has authority to assess civil money
penalties against individuals who violate its regulations. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221(d), 1223(d),
1227(b), 1229, 1253(c), 1281(d), 1284(a), 1285, 1286, 1287, 1321, 1322(a) and (b),
1323(b) (1970). The Supreme Court held that this assessment is subject only to limited
judicial review. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonina Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329
(1932); Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324 (1932); Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). However, these cases did not deal with seventh
amendment challenges. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). An individual who violates the Immigration and
Naturalization Service regulations may also be subject to criminal penalties. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1324-28 (1970).
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.
(1970), has authority to assess civil money penalties against individuals who violate
its regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), (b), (c), (d) and (h) (1970). Judicial review of the
agency's factual determinations is limited by the substantial evidence rule. 29 U.S.C.
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adjudicatory process established by each of the agencies' regulations
does not include trial court participation. Instead, these agencies may
assess monetary fines upon final, factual determinations7 by adminis-
trative commissions. Although the decisions of these commissions
may be appealed, they are appealable only to the circuit courts where
review is restricted by the substantial evidence rule." Consequently,
an individual's fine is based upon a non-judicial factual determina-
tion which inevitably denies him his seventh amendment right.
This conclusive fact-finding by an administrative agency seems to
violate the seventh amendment guarantee of the right to jury trial in
suits at common law.' The guarantee has been construed to extend
to actions involving legal rights and remedies,'" and the assessment
§ 660(a) (1970). An individual who violates an OSHA regulation may also be subject
to criminal penalties. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e), (f) and (g) (1970).
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board's authority to assess civil money penalties
is based on 12 U.S.C. §§ 1425a(d), 1425b(b) (1970). There has never been an appeal
of a Bank Board's decision; however, counsel for the FHLBB has indicated that
"[judiciall review would be limited to considering whether the Board . . . acted
arbitrarily or capriciously." Goldschmid, supra note 1, at 952 n.5.
The United States Postal Service may assess civil money penalties for violations
of its regulations. 39 U.S.C. §§ 5206, 5603 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (1970). The
courts have ruled that this assessment is subject only to limited judicial review. All-
man v. United States, 131 U.S. 31 (1889); Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 36 F.
433 (8th Cir. 1916). These cases, however, did not deal with Seventh amendment
challenges. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir. 1975)
(Gibbons, J. dissenting).
In 1973, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(Supp. III, 1973), which authorizes the Secretary of Interior to assess civil money
penalties subject only to limited judicial review. 16 U.SC. § 1540(a) (Supp. 111, 1973).
In 1974, Congress enacted Fair Labor Standard Amendments, 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-16
(Supp. IV, 1974), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), which authorized the Secre-
tary of Labor to assess civil money penalties against individuals for violations of the
child labor regulations. Judicial review of this assessment is subject only to limited
review. 29 U.S.C. § 216(e) (Supp. IV, 1974).
7 It is a question of fact whether an individual has violated an administrative
regulation which subjects him to a civil money penalty. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v.
OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, aff'd on rehearing, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975); Atlas Roofing
Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498
F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
x Under the substantial evidence rule, findings of fact by an administrative com-
mission are accepted by a reviewing court unless they are unreasonable conclusions
from the record. The substantial evidence rule is designed to give administrative
findings a greater degree of finality than the clearly erroneous rule accords to judicial
findings of fact. See 4 DAvis, supra note 3, at § 29.02; JAFFE, supra note 3, at 615.
For text of the seventh amendment see note 5, supra.
,o Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974); see text accompanying notes 40-47 infra.
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of a monetary penalty, like a suit for damages or debt," appears to
be of essentially legal character. Indeed, the courts have held that in
those regulatory frameworks which require trial court involvement,
2
the seventh amendment right to jury trial is available when an
agency seeks imposition of a civil money penalty.' 3 Thus, it seems
that the jury trial right should also be required within the framework
for the assessment of civil money penalties by these six administra-
tive agencies. The Supreme Court and the lower courts, however,
have apparently concluded that the seventh amendment neither ap-
plies to administrative hearings nor requires trial court participation
in the adjudicatory processes of these six agencies.14
In Frank Irey, Jr. Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission'5 and Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission'" the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals held that the imposition of a civil money penalty by an
administrative commission, whose decision was subject only to lim-
ited judicial review, was constitutional under the seventh amend-
ment. 7 In both cases, the defendant companies were cited for viola-
" Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1961); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11[5] (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as MOOREI.
12 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970), where the Federal Trade Commission is given
authority to fine an individual for violation of a cease and desist order subject to the
right of the defendant to request a trial de novo; 49 U.S.C. § 1487 (1970), where it is
stated that the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Authority must
institute proceedings in a district court to enforce their regulations. For a listing of
those regulatory frameworks that require trial court participation see Goldschmid,
supra note 1, tables at 950-52.
," United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974); see Note,
Judicial Review-Defendant Has Right to Trial by Jury and Trial De Novo in Action
Seeking Civil Penalties for Violation of Federal Trade Commission Order, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1035 (1975) (supporting court's decision); Note, Jury Trial-Defendant in Suit
by an Administrative Agency to Collect Statutory Civil Penalties for Violation of
Agency Orders Has a Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 53 TEXAS L. REv.
387 (1975) (criticizing court's decision); cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990
(5th Cir. 1975).
II Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 194 (1974); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937);
Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936); see 1 DAvis, supra note 3, at §
8.16; MOORE, supra note 11, at 38.08[5].
" 519 F.2d 1200, aff'd on rehearing, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
44 U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976) (No. 75-748).
Is 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S. Mar. 23,
1976) (No. 75-746).
' Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1215, 1215-19 (3d Cir. 1975); Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tions of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
standards. In hearings before OSHA examiners, each was found
guilty and fined. Appeals were taken to the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, where full hearings on the merits were
held, and the companies were again found guilty and fined. The
companies then appealed to the governing circuit courts challenging
the constitutional validity of the regulatory framework in which
OSHA operated. They argued that the failure to review the adminis-
trative determinations in a trial de novo'5 in which a jury trial would
be available, violated the seventh amendment. 9 The Irey and Atlas
Roofing courts rejected this argument, concluding that the seventh
amendment was inapplicable to administrative proceedings. " Short
and simple, this statement comprised both the rationale and decision
of the circuit courts.
The Irey and Atlas Roofing courts relied on NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.' as the principal authority for their holdings.
2
In Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court held that an administrative
order to pay back wages to a wrongfully discharged employee did not
violate the seventh amendment although the order was subject only
to limited judicial review.? The Court based its decision on the find-
ing that the monetary award was merely incidental to the equitable
relief of injunction. Because the seventh amendment applied only to
suits at law, and injunctive-relief was the province of equity, the right
to jury trial was held inapplicable. Additionally, the Court concluded
,1 A trial de novo is an entirely new hearing that proceeds as though there have
been no previous determinations, either administrative or judicial. The court is not
bound by any fact finding of the administrative commission unlike the six regulatory
frameworks in which judicial review is restricted by the substantial evidence rule. See
note 6 supra.
" Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1215, 1215-19 (3d Cir. 1975); Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 990, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1975). The defendants also
argued that the nonjury assessment and imposition of the fine violated their sixth
amendment right to jury trial in criminal cases. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519
F.2d 1200, 1200-07 (3d Cir. 1975); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 990-1011
(5th Cir. 1975).
" Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1215, 1215-19 (3d Cir. 1975); Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1975).
21 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
212 Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1215, 1216-17 (3d Cir. 1975). Although
the Atlas Roofing court did not cite Jones & Laughlin, it did cite Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), and Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 518 F.2d at
1011. In Curtis it is stated that "Jones & Laughlin merely stands for the proposition
that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative procedures
." 415 U.S. at 194. See similar language in Pernell, 416 U.S. at 383.
301 U.S. at 48-49.
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that the administrative power to compel payment of back wages was
a newly created statutory action which did not exist under the com-
mon law in 1791 and was therefore not an action to which the seventh
amendment applied.
2
Traditionally, the seventh amendment was construed to preserve
the right to jury trial as it existed at common law in England in
1791.25 This preservation aspect led to the development of two tests
for determining the propriety of jury trials: the strict historical test, "
which applied the seventh amendment only to those actions recog-
nized by the common law in 1791; and the flexible historical test,2
which extended the seventh amendment to newly created actions if
they were analogous to actions recognized by the common law in
1791. Both of these tests focused on the overall character of an action
rather than on individual issues. The tests thus preserved the power
of the equity chancellor to weigh the importance of the legal and
equitable issues within one action and determine a single, dominant
character.', Consequently, even though an issue recognized by the
common law in 1791 was present in an action, the judge could deem
that issue less important than an equitable issue in the action. By
determining that the legal issue was incidental to the equitable one,
he could then characterize the overall nature of the action as equita-
ble and deny the seventh amendment right to jury trial.
29
These historical tests, as exemplified by the Jones & Laughlin
decision, have been the primary obstacles to applying the seventh
amendment to legal issues that are adjudicated within an adminis-
trative framework that does not require a trial court. 0 Recently, how-
2 Id. The Jones & Laughlin Court based its decision on the strict historical test.
See text accompanying notes 25-29 infra.
2 MOORE, supra note 11, at 1 38.08[5]. For general discussions concerning the
history and the application.of the seventh amendment, see Henderson, The Back-
ground of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966); James, Right to a
Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L. J. 655 (1963).
2" See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); MOORE, supra note 11, at 38.11
[71.
, See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 488 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting); MOORE,
supra note 11, at $ 38.1117].
2 MOORE, supra note 11, at 38.1116].
11 The historical tests also preserved the power of the chancellor to determine the
order in which issues in a single action would be tried. This determination denied
application of the seventh amendment to those cases in which decisions of the equita-
ble issue before the legal issue resolved the case. Id.
"' See 1 DAVIS, supra note 3, at § 8.16; Goldschmid, supra note 1, at 944; MOORE,
supra note 11, at 38.08[5]; Comment, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 345 (1974) supra note 3
at 350.
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ever, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of seventh
amendment application. In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood31 and Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,31 the Court held that whenever any legal
issues were present in a case, the right to a jury trial of those issues
could not be denied. The Court reasoned that the merger of law and
equity in 193831 removed all procedural justifications for denying the
jury trial of legal issues which were part of an action that also in-
cluded equitable issues.3 4 The Court stated that the emphasis was no
longer to be placed upon the overall nature of an action, but upon the
nature of each particular issue to be tried. Emphasizing the import-
ance and the value of juries, the Court ruled that the right to a jury
trial of a legal issue could not be denied by trying an equitable issue
first or by labeling a legal issue incidental to an equitable one.3 r
Although the expansion of seventh amendment applicability under
these rulings was significant, the result in the administrative proce-
dure for assessment of civil money penalties remained unchanged.
Under the Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres decisions, the focus of
the jury trial right was reduced to each issue, but the historical tests
retained vitality as the method for determining whether jury trial was
available. Thus, seventh amendment application to the assessment
of monetary fines by administrative commissions, would still have
been denied because such regulatory action did not exist or have any
3' 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Dairy Queen, Wood failed to tender a contract payment
to Dairy Queen for the use of the name "Dairy Queen." Dairy Queen brought suit to
enjoin Wood from using the name "Dairy Queen" and for contract damages. The Court
held that an action for contract damages was a legal issue which entitled a party to a
jury trial on demand and could not be labelled as merely incidental to the equitable
remedy of injunction. Id. at 479.
32 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon Theatres, Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc.,
brought suit against Beacon Theatres, Inc., for declaratory relief concerning a contro-
versy arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Fox requested a declaration that its
agreements with film distributors were not in violation of the antitrust laws and for
an injunction to prevent Beacon from instituting an action under the antitrust laws
against Fox. In its answer, Beacon counterclaimed and crossclaimed raising the issues
of antitrust violations and asking for treble damages. Beacon also demanded a jury
trial, but the district court viewed the issue raised by the complaint as equitable and
directed that this issue be tried before the legal issues for treble damages. 359 U.S. at
503. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial judge had acted properly
in denying Beacon's request for a jury trial. 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958). The Supreme
Court reversed. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
' Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471-72 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
" Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
"' Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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analogue at common law. These decisions, however, marked only the
beginning of the Supreme Court's redefinition of the extent of jury
trial availability.
The Supreme Court subsequently added two new considerations
for determining the propriety of a jury trial for a particular issue. In
Ross v. Bernhard,37 the Court noted that in addition to the pre-merger
common law characterization of the issue, a judge should also con-
sider whether the remedy sought was traditionally denominated a
legal one.3" If both the issue and the remedy were previously recog-
nized at common law, the Court held that the seventh amendment
right to jury trial should be granted unless the practical limitations
of juries would prevent a fair adjudication . 3 Thus, by mandating
consideration of the nature of the remedy sought and the suitability
of a jury, Ross reduced the emphasis formerly placed on the historical
tests. Two later Supreme Court decisions rejected the historical tests
in their entirety.
In Curtis v. Loether"° and Pernell v. Southall Realty,4 the Court
Stated that in deciding whether a jury trial was available for a partic-
ular issue, a judge should determine if the issue was legal. This deter-
mination was based only on the nature of the right sought to be
enforced and the remedy sought to be invoked.4 2 The historical tests
were specifically rejected" on the reasoning that the term "common
law", as used in the seventh amendment, was not intended to restrict
the amendment's application to common law forms of action. Rather,
the term identified suits that involved legal rights and remedies in
contradistinction to equitable rights and remedies.4 Thus, the right
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
Id. at 538 n.10.
39 Id.
" 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
416 U.S. 363 (1974).
12 Id. at 375.
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374 (1974).
" The Court in both Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974), and Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1974), quoted Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 474 (1830). In that case, the Court stated:
The phrase "common law," found in . . . [the seventh amendment],
is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime
jurisprudence . . . . By common law [the framers of the amend-
ment] meant . . . not merely suits, which the common law recog-
nized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered . . . . In a just sense, the amendment
CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES
to jury trial was held to be available for all issues which were not of
equity and admiralty jurisdiction, regardless of the peculiar form in
which they arose. 5 The test of seventh amendment application to a
particular issue was defined simply as whether the issue involved
"rights and remedies. . . traditionally enforced in an action at law
1)46
Applying the Curtis-Pernell test4 7 for determining the propriety of
jury trial, the assessment of a civil money penalty seemingly requires
the availability of the seventh amendment right. The primary issue
in actions for civil money penalties is whether an individual has
violated an administrative regulation." The right sought to be en-
forced is that of an agency to collect the penalty; the remedy invoked
is a civil money judgment.
Because administrative agencies are governmental bodies, the
right of an agency must be a governmental right. The courts have
construed the right of the government to collect monetary fines as a
legal right. 9 In addition, this right has been characterized as a com-
mon law action for debt 0 to which the seventh amendment guarantee
of jury trial applies.-' Thus, an agency's right to collect a civil money
penalty appears to be one traditionally enforced in an action at law.
If the first half of the Curtis-Pernell test is met as suggested, the
availability of jury trial depends only on whether the civil money
penalty is a legal remedy. The Supreme Court has been explicit in
ruling that a money judgment is a remedy traditionally sought in an
action at law. In Whitehead v. Shattuck,2 the Court stated:
then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of
equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form
which they may assume to settle legal rights.
Id. at 478-79.
's Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 474, 478-79 (1830).
' Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 11974).
' Neither the Curtis nor Pernell decision considered the third prong of the Ross
test for determining the propriety of a jury trial, the "abilities and limitations of
juries." 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. Thus, it would seem that the ability and limitation of a
jury should have no affect on a decision to grant or deny jury trial. However, the
Supreme Court neither included nor rejected this consideration in the Curtis-Pernell
test to determine if the seventh amendment is applicable to an issue.
1 See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, aff'd on rehearing, 519 F.2d
1215 (3d Cir. 1975); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1961).
50 Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1961).
" MOORE, supra note 11, at 38.11[5].
52 138 U.S. 146 (1891).
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It would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to state any
general rule which would determine, in all cases, what should
be deemed a suit in equity as distinguished from an action at
law ... but this may be said, that, where an action is simply
. . . for the recovery of a money judgment, the action is one
at law.
53
Because a civil money penalty is a money judgment for the fining
agency, the Whitehead language appears to mandate the conclusion
that this penalty is a legal remedy and that the second half of the
Curtis-Pernell test is also satisfied. Indeed, in United States v. J. B.
Williams Co.,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
action brought by the Federal Trade Commission to collect a civil
money penalty for violation of a cease and desist order involved a
legal right and a legal remedy.55 Relying on Curtis," the court con-
cluded that the imposition of a civil money penalty required the
application of the seventh amendment.57 Thus, a jury trial was avail-
able to the defendant upon demand.
In Williams, however, the appeals process included a trial de
novo, and the Second Circuit ruled that a jury trial could only be
ordered at this stage.5 1 Williams, therefore, is distinguishable from
Irey and Atlas Roofing on the grounds that the OSHA procedure for
the assessment and imposition of civil money penalties does not in-
volve a trial court.59 The Fifth Circuit approved the Williams decision
in Atlas Roofing, but held it inapplicable to OSHA proceedings on
these exact grounds. 0 Although recognizing that the administrative
assessment and imposition of a money judgment involved a legal
right and a legal remedy, the Atlas Roofing court nevertheless con-
cluded that the seventh amendment was inapplicable to administra-
5 Id. at 151.
5 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974). See Note, Judicial Review-Defendant Has Right
to Trial by Jury and Trial De Novo in Action Seeking Civil Penalties for Violation of
Federal Trade Commission Order, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1035 (1975) (supporting court's
decision); Note, Jury Trial-Defendant in Suit by an Administrative Agency to Collect
Statutory Civil Penalties for Violation of Agency Orders Has a Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 53 TEXAs L. REv. 387 (1975) (criticizing court's decision); cf.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
498 F.2d at 424.
' Id. The court did not cite Pernell; however, it should be noted that the Pernell
case was decided only one week before the Second Circuit decided Williams.
5 Id. at 421-30.
I Id.
' See note 6 supra.
" Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1975).
CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES
tive proceedings and could not be invoked outside a judicial trial
setting."
The Atlas Roofing and Irey courts based their refusals to accept
the legal rights and remedies analysis on the Jones & Laughlin pre-
cedent that the seventh amendment is inapplicable to administrative
proceedings.2 This reliance on Jones & Laughlin appears erroneous
in light of the more recent Supreme Court decisions in Curtis 3 and
Pernell.14 Indeed, these later cases, which supplanted the historical
tests with the legal rights and remedies analysis, seemingly mandate
provision for jury trial in cases involving civil money penalties."7
Moreover, the back pay award in Jones & Laughlin was requested as
an incident to injunctive relief and may therefore be classified as
equitable.6 Seemingly, the Jones & Laughlin Court should have de-
nied a jury trial because the relief was equitable rather than legal, a
more preferable and accurate line of reasoning than the "incidental
to equitable remedy" and "unheard of at common law" rationales.
67
Thus, even assuming that the Jones & Laughlin precedent is valid
after the Curtis and Pernell decisions, its application would appear
limited to administrative proceedings which involve equitable issues.
Since the seventh amendment does not apply to cases within equity
jurisdiction,66 Jones & Laughlin could be read to represent no devia-
tion from the standard rule of seventh amendment applicability and
to possess little value as precedent for denying a jury trial in civil
money penalty cases which are of purely legal character.69 Judge Gib-
I d.
e2 In Irey, the court held that Jones & Laughlin represented the seventh amend-
ment's inapplicability to administrative hearings. 519 F.2d at 1216. The Atlas Roofing
court relied on Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), to support the same proposition.
However, the court in Curtis also based its analysis upon Jones & Laughlin:
Jones & Laughlin [301 U.S. 1 (1937)] . . .stands for the proposition
that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administra-
tive proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the
whole concept of administrative adjudication ....
415 U.S. at 194 (footnote omitted).
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
416 U.S. 363 (1974).
See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
" Back pay awards are generally considered equitable. See, e.g., EEOC v. Laacke
& Joys Co., 375 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir. 1971). But see Lazor, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases -
Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 483 (1975).
'7 See 301 U.S. at 48.
The seventh amendment provides for a jury trial "[iln Suits at common law."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
go Note, Trial by Jury - OSHA and the Seventh Amendment, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG
U. L. REv. 543, 551.
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bons, dissenting in Irey, recognized this limitation of Jones &
Laughlin to equitable proceedings and rejected its use to support the
denial of the right of jury trial in an OSHA money penalty proceed-
ing."0 Under the Curtis-Pernell test, he stated that a civil money
penalty involved a legal right and a legal remedy, and accordingly,
the right to jury trial must be afforded whenever such an assessment
is made. 7
In both Curtis7 2 and Pernell,7 3 however, the Supreme Court by way
of dicta reiterated the general proposition of Jones & Laughlin that
the seventh amendment does not apply to administrative proceed-
ings. When juxtaposed to the legal rights and remedies test adopted
in these cases, the reiteration of the Jones & Laughlin exception for
administrative proceedings appears contradictory. 74 In the case of
administratively assessed civil money penalties, which clearly in-
volve the adjudication of legal rights and the awarding of legal reme-
dies,, the Jones & Laughlin proposition suggests a result contrary to
that mandated by the Curtis-Pernell test for seventh amendment
applicability. Of course, it may be argued that the Court actively
attempted to make a permanent exception for administrative adjudi-
cations under the rationale that these adjudications did not come
within the seventh amendment's application to suits "at common
law." Such a reading would provide support for the Atlas Roofing and
Irey courts' reliance on Jones & Laughlin.7" However, because of the
mandatory language used by the Court in setting forth the legal rights
and remedies analysis, another reading of the reiteration of the gen-
eral proposition appears more probably correct.
In both Curtis and Pernell, to support the administrative excep-
tion to the jury trial guarantee, the Court cited authority which
merely denies seventh amendment applicability in essentially equita-
ble administrative proceedings.77 The utilization of this limited au-
70 519 F.2d at 1222.
7' Id. at 1223-25.
72 415 U.S. at 194.
416 U.S. at 383.
The Jones & Laughlin proposition in combination with the Curtis-Pernell test,
however, does not represent a conflict if Jones & Laughlin is read to represent the
denial of the seventh amendment only when an administrative proceeding involves
equitable issues.
11 See text accompanying notes 47-57 supra.
7' See note 62 supra.
" In Curtis, the Court noted that Congress had the power to entrust the enforce-
ment of statutory rights to an administrative agency without providing for a jury trial
under the seventh amendment. 415 U.S. at 195. To support this statement, the Court
relied upon NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Katchen v.
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thority suggests, as Judge Gibbons noted with regard to Jones &
Laughlin, that the general proposition was not meant to preclude jury
trial in administrative cases involving legal rights and legal reme-
dies." Moreover, in Curtis, the Court affirmatively stated that the
right to jury trial applies regardless of the particular form in which
legal rights are adjudicated.79 The combination of this express disre-
gard for the form of adjudication with the limited authority utilized
Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); and Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528 (1899).
However, all three of these cases based the denial of the right to a jury trial upon the
equitable nature of the subject matter of the litigation. Jones & Laughlin represented
the denial of a jury trial in an essentially equitable proceeding because the remedy
sought was back pay. See text accompanying note 66 supra. Similarly, Katchen
involved a summary proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act in which the Court denied
a trial by jury on the grounds that "proceedings of bankruptcy courts are inherently
proceedings in equity." 382 U.S. at 336. See also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 240 (1934). The third case, Guthrie Nat'l Bank, involved the adjudication of a
claim against a municipal corporation. The Court, in denying a jury trial, stated that
such claims did not involve a legal obligation since "the power of the State as sover-
eign" to exercise jurisdiction over municipal corporations involves a recognition that
those obligations are based upon essentially equitable and moral considerations. 173
U.S. at 534-35, 537.
In Pernell, the Court cited an additional case, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921),
to support its refusal to apply the seventh amendment to administrative proceedings.
The Block Court sustained the operation of a rent control commission established to
cope with critical housing conditions caused by World War I. The denial of the right
to a jury trial in the commission's hearings was based upon the constitutional war
power of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This provision allows Congress to deal
comprehensively with all of the exigencies created by war. 256 U.S. at 158. The control
of rents to protect the country against inflation is included as a proper case in which
Congress may deal with an exigency created by war. Brown v. Wright, 137 F.2d 484,
489 (4th Cir. 1943). In such situations, essential liberties do not have their same
universal application. United States v. Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657 (W.D.
Wash. 1942), aff'd, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Block is thus inapplicable to the ordinary
administrative assessment of a civil money penalty, and merely stands for the suspen-
sion of normal remedies in the proper exercise of Congress' war powers.
1K Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Irey, stated that the reference to Jones & Laughlin
by the Supreme Court in both Curtis and Pernell merely represented the Court's
approval of the denial of the right to jury trial when the administrative proceeding
decided matters of an equitable, rather than legal nature. 519 F.2d at 1222-23.
" The Curtis Court stated:
By common law [the framers of the amendment] meant . . . not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascer-
tained and determined . . . . In a just sense, the [seventh] amend-
ment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not
of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever might be the peculiar
form which they may assume to settle legal rights.
415 U.S. at 193, quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 474, 478-79 (1830)
(emphasis by Curtis Court).
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by the Court to support the general proposition that the seventh
amendment is inapplicable to administrative proceedings, implies a
narrowing of the Jones & Laughlin language to deny a jury trial only
in equitable administrative proceedings." Furthermore, this narrow-
ing fully resolves the apparent conflict between the Curtis-Pernell
legal rights and remedies analysis and the dicta regarding the admin-
istrative exception. Since the denial of a jury trial would be limited
to equitable administrative proceedings, the legal right and remedy
analysis would still insure seventh amendment applicability to an
administrative adjudication of a legal issue.
Disregarding the apparent conflict and Judge Gibbons' analysis,
however, the Irey and Atlas Roofing courts failed to focus upon the
distinction between legal and equitable administrative proceedings.
Instead, the courts relied on the general proposition that the seventh
amendment is inapplicable to all administrative proceedings regard-
less of the subject of adjudication."' In placing controlling importance
on the Jones & Laughlin precedent, both courts noted that Congress
had the power to entrust the enforcement of statutory rights to an
administrative agency without providing for a jury trial.2 In so hold-
ing, the courts suggested that all administrative proceedings, neces-
sarily creatures of Congress, were not "suits at common law" to which
the seventh amendment was applicable. Not only do these decisions
ignore the legal rights and remedies test, but the proposition that
Congress has full power to legislate around the seventh amendment
openly contradicts the Supreme Court's protection of constitutional
guarantees.
When confronted with congressional attempts to override consti-
tutional guarantees, the Supreme Court has consistently subordi-
"O See note 78 supra.
" See note 62 supra.
'z The Irey court held:
[Tihe Seventh Amendment is not applicable, at least in the context
of a case such as this one . . . [in which] Congress is free to provide
an administrative enforcement scheme without the intervention of a
jury at any stage.
519 F.2d at 1218.
The Atlas Roofing court similarly stated:
That the civil sanction under attack is in the form of a dollar penalty
is not a sufficient distinction to deny the power of Congress to pre-
scribe an administrative, as distinguished from a judicial mechanism.
To so hold would produce the absurd spectacle of Congress - having
full power to prescribe an administrative structure with sanctions of
denial or revocation of a life-or-death license - being denied the power
to prescribe a money fine of a single dollar . . ..
518 F.2d at 1011-12.
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nated congtessional power. For example, in Tucker v. Texas,8' the
Court held that neither Congress nor agencies acting under congres-
sional authorization could deny the freedom of press and religion
guaranteed by the first amendment.84 Similar constitutionally protec-
tive stances were taken by the Court when congressional power
clashed with the fourth amendment" right against unreasonable
search and seizure,"8 and the fifth amendment 7 protection from self-
incrimination." Additionally, the Court has stated that Congress
may not deny the personal freedoms guaranteed by the Bil of Rights
even when exercising its power to create adjudicative bodies under
Article I rather than Article III of the Constitution.89
The territorial courts provide the best example of Congress' abil-
ity to create adjudicative bodies under general legislative power."
326 U.S. 517 (1946).
' Id. at 520.
The fourth amendment provides, in part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ....
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'7 The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
' United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). The Court held that
the act of taking a civilian ex-serviceman from the United States to Korea to be
punished for a crime under the Uniform Code of Military Justice extended beyond the
constitutional grant of power to military tribunals:
[T]he constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the
armed forces . . . does not empower Congress to deprive people of
trials under Bill of Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold
that power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Id. at 21-22.
go These adjudicative bodies are called "legislative courts," a concept originating
in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 685 (1828). "Legislative courts,"
created under general legislative powers, were distinguished from "constitutional
courts," which were explicitly provided for by Article M of the Constitution. Id. Con-
gress may require these "legislative courts" to render advisory opinions and perform
administrative and legislative tasks. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553
(1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). Most "legislative courts" are
created under Congress' Article I authority. See, e.g., Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438 (1929). However, "legislative courts" are created under general legislative author-
ity other than Article I. For example, territorial courts were created under Congress'
Article IV power to provide for the management of the territories. American Ins. Co.
v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 685, 689 (1828). See generally, Comment, The Distinction
between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect On Judicial Assignment,
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Despite the broad congressional discretion to provide for these courts,
the Supreme Court in Black v. Jackson9' held that the seventh
amendment automatically extended to these forums because Con-
gress could not deny the individual right to jury trial in appropriate
"common law" cases . 2 Apparently, the Court was outlining the rule
later echoed in Curtis v. Loether93 that the particular form of adjudi-
cation was not determinative of the constitutional guarantee. 4 The
derivation of this rule can be further traced to the Supreme Court's
statement in Springville v. Thomas95 that:
[T]he Seventh Amendment secured unanimity in finding a
verdict as an essential feature of trial by jury in common law
cases, and the act of Congress [in creating territorial courts]
could not impart the power to change the constitutional rule
96
Because this power to create adjudicative bodies unrestricted by
Article III of the Constitution also authorizes the creation of adminis-
trative agen cies to settle various disputes, the constitutional
guarantees should have inherent application in this area. Indeed, in
ICC v. Brimson,9 7 the Supreme Court held that Congress' constitu-
tional power to regulate interstate commerce through the Interstate
Commerce Commission did not permit Congress to deny "those fun-
damental guarantees of personal rights that are recognized by the
Constitution as inhering in the freedom of the citizen."9 In sustaining
62 COLUM. L. REV. 133 (1962); Note, The Legislative Court Problem: A Proposed
Solution, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 302 (1963); Note, Legislative and Constitutional Courts:
What Lurks Ahead for Bifurcation, 71 YALE L.J. 979 (1962).
177 U.S. 349 (1900).
9 Id. at 363. The Supreme Court in Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516
(1905), similarly held that the sixth amendment automatically extended to territorial
courts although Congress failed to provide for the right to jury trial in criminal cases.
,3 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
" See note 79 supra.
" 166 U.S. 707 (1897).
,1 Id. at 708-09.
'7 154 U.S. 447 (1894). The Court held that allowing the criminal prosecution of a
witness in an Interstate Commerce Commission hearing for his refusal to appear and
present evidence was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that permitting such a
criminal hearing on the part of an administrative agency represented the granting of
judicial power and that it was beyond the power of Congress to provide for such
criminal punishment.
" Id. at 479. The Brimson Court also stated:
In accomplishing the objects of a power granted to it, Congress may
employ any one or all the modes that are appropriate to the end in
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the congressional adoption of the OSHA administrative enforcement
scheme, which completely subordinates the seventh amendment, the
Atlas Roofing and Irey courts ignored the principle that forbids Con-
gress to nullify constitutional guarantees through legislation. More-
over, the approach taken by these courts appears contrary to the
expressed aim of the seventh amendment to "preserve the substance
of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere
matters of form or procedure." 9
In contrast to the Atlas Roofing and Irey decisions, the Second
Circuit in the recent case of Damsky v. Zavatt'00 seemingly adhered
to the view that preserves the substance of the seventh amendment
over the form of adjudication. Damsky involved an action by the
United States against a husband and wife to collect various taxes,
penalties, and interest, and to establish and foreclose tax liens on the
real property of the wife. In response to the district court's denial of
jury trial,'"' the Second Circuit held that in the government's action
for foreclosure the wife had no right to jury trial because the relief
sought was equitable. However, as to the suit to enforce the hus-
band's sole liability for taxes, penalties, and interest, the court held
that since the action was in the nature of a single action for debt, a
jury trial was required under the seventh amendment.0 2 In refusing
to subordinate the seventh amendment to equity jurisdiction, the
Damsky court distinguished the case of Wickwire v. Reinecke,0 3 in
which the Supreme Court stated. that Congress could provide for any
reasonable system for the collection of taxes without a jury.1 The
Second Circuit suggested that this statement could not be extended
to cover district court adjudications of common law rights since the
Wickwire Court relied only on authority cbncerning summary adjudi-
cation outside a judicial setting.' 5 In distinguishing between the ap-
plication of the seventh amendment in judicial and administrative
settings; the Damsky court declined to decide whether a difference
view, taking care only that no mode employed is inconsistent with the
limitations of the Constitution.
Id. at 478.
" Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). See
MOORE, supra note 11, 38.08[5] at 84.1.
' 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961).
'Q' United States v. Damsky, 187 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
102 289 F.2d at 51.
" 275 U.S. 101 (1927).
'" Id. at 105-06.
' 289 F.2d at 51.
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in setting would affect the right to jury trial.0 However, the authority
upon which the Wickwire Court based its broad statement concerning
congressional power, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Co., I'll does not support the exercise of that power to provide for
the administrative adjudication of common law claims without a
jury.
In Murray's Lessee, the Supreme Court sustained an act of Con-
gress empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a distress
warrant and sell property of a defaulting tax collector without judicial
proceedings. The denial of jury trial in this case, however, resulted
from the application of the concept of "public" versus "private"
rights."18 "Private" rights were identified as those usually asserted by
individuals in actions at law and were within the scope of the seventh
amendment. "Public" rights were identified as those rights in which
the public at large was interested. Since viewed as the counterpart
to the legal "private" right, the "public" right was automatically
classified as equitable and thus without the scope of seventh amend-
ment application.' 9 This concept is of limited value today since
courts look beyond the "public" or "private" nature of the right
asserted." 0 Moreover, even though the Murray Court applied the
archaic "public-private" doctrine, it also enunciated the general
principle that Congress cannot "withdraw from judicial cognizance
any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
' Id. at 52.
" 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
The Murray Court stated:
[Tlhere are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress
[sic] may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, as it may deem proper.
Id. at 284. See also JAFFE, supra note 3, at 87-88.
See Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Seventh
Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 405 (1973); JAFFE, supra note 3, at 90.
1" Id. Although many actions which have been statutorialy created are undoubt-
edly involved with furthering the public interest, this "public" characterization of the
action will not offset application of the seventh amendment where an adjudication
involves a matter concerning the "common law" right to a jury trial. E.g., Fleitmann
v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (right to jury trial granted in treble
damages anti-trust suit); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (right to jury
trial granted in a suit to collect a statutory penalty asserted in the public interest).
Louis Jaffe criticizes the use of the "public-private" right concept by noting that it is
based upon custom rather than upon any logical analysis of Article mH. He also recog-
nizes that nearly any controversy could be viewed as involving public rights. JAFFE,
supra note 3, at 90.
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common law . . ."I" Thus, even under the Murray case, where a
civil money penalty action is analyzed as a suit in the nature of the
common law under current seventh amendment interpretation, Con-
gress is prohibited from denying a jury trial.1
2
With the current expansion of the role of administrative agencies,
however, the Supreme Court has recognized that an agency can de-
termine matters which are generally within judicial cognizance if
the administrative scheme allows participation by the courts where
necessary to protect individual rights."3 Under this recognition of
agency-court interaction, the jury trial right can be provided in ac-
cordance with the Black v. Jackson"' and Springville v. Thomas"'
rulings."' Where the subject of an administrative adjudication in-
volves a legal right and remedy, which under the Curtis-Pernell test
would require provision of the right to jury trial,"7 the seventh
amendment guarantee can be afforded by a trial de novo in a district
court. 8 Such a procedure would be consistent with the principle that
the courts participate in administrative enforcement where neces-
sary. Indeed, the Third Circuit"' and Congress have recognized that
where an administrative agency performs an adjudicative function
involving a common law right, a trial de novo is necessary to fulfill
the seventh amendment guarantee.
1 59 U.S. at 284.
. Jaffe notes that while Murray's Lessee stands for the proposition that the
adjudication of issues concerning "public" rights might be entrusted to special tribun-
als, he also recognizes that when a "public" right involves the common law within the
meaning of the seventh amendment, Congress' freedom to confer jurisdiction is thereby
restricted. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 90-91.
"I Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944). See also United States v. ICC,
337 U.S. 426 (1949), where the Supreme Court held that denying a trial on the merits
in federal district court because a plaintiff had been denied relief in a prior complaint
before the Interstate Commerce Commission was improper:
Such a sweeping contention for administrative finality is out of har-
mony with the general legislative pattern of administrative and judi-
cial relationships.
Id. at 433-34 (footnote omitted).
2 177 U.S. 349 (1900).
" 166 U. S. 707 (1897).
2 See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
." See text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
Note, Application of Constitutional Guarantees of Jury Trial to the Adminis-
trative Process, 56 HARv. L. REv. 282 (1942). See text accompanying notes 119-27 infra.
"I It must be noted that the Third Circuit decided Western N.Y. & Pa. Ry. Co.
v. Penn Refining Co., 137 F. 343 (3d Cir. 1905), aff'd, 208 U.S. 208 (1908) and Lehigh
Valley Ry. Co. v. Clark, 207 F. 717 (3d Cir. 1913), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Mills v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 473 (1915) many years before its decision in
Irey. However, the Irey court failed to mention the Western and Lehigh holdings.
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In Western New York & Pennsylvania Railway Co. v. Penn
Refining Co., 20 the Third Circuit noted that prior to the congressional
enactment of the provisions which allowed a trial de novo appeal from
reparation proceedings2 ' before the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion,'2 2 the ICC declined to recommend pecuniary reparation.'
2 3
The Commission's refusal was based upon its understanding that an
action to enforce a monetary reparation order required the right to
jury trial under the seventh amendment. 4 The Third Circuit ex-
pressed agreement with the ICC by further noting that the new pro-
vision for de novo review was necessary to insure the seventh amend-
ment right because the agency could not enforce pecuniary reparation
without resort to judicial proceedings providing for jury trial.
2 5
The court, eight years later in Lehigh Valley Railway Co. v.
Clark, 12'reiterated this earlier statement that a claim for damages in
a reparation proceeding before the ICC is an action in which the
2 137 F. 343 (3d Cir. 1905), afJ'd, 208 U.S. 208 (1908).
1 A reparation proceeding involves the administrative imposition of money dam-
ages. When a proper complaint is made to an administrative agency, it has the duty
to make a finding of facts, to adjudicate the matter based on the facts, and to award
money damages. E.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 13-14 (1970).
' The Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970), provides in part:
If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money
within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person
for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the district court
of the United States . . . a complaint [for] . . . damages . . . . Such
suit. . . shall proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages,
except . . . the findings and order of the Commission shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated ....
Id. Congress has granted this same right of a trial de novo before a judge and jury to
the parties in other reparation proceedings. See Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 829 (1970);
Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970); Perishable Agricultural Com-
modities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499(g) (1970). This right of a trial de novo allows the right to
a jury trial in district courts whereas the six administrative agencies which impose civil
money penalties only allow an appeal to a federal court of appeals without a right to a
jury. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
12 137 F. at 349.
12, The Western court held:
In proceedings at law under section 16, as amended, for the enforce-
ment of an order or requirement of the commission, the parties are
entitled to an impartial trial by jury, so conducted as to accord to
them in full measure the enjoyment of their constitutional right. The
[de novo] procedure contemplated by the act and, unless waived,
required by the Constitution, is jury trial . ...
Id. at 350.
"I Id. at 349-50.
129 207 F. 717 (3d Cir. 1913), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 473 (1915).
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parties are at some point entitled to trial by jury.'27 Thus, it appears
that both Congress, by enacting the trial de novo provision, and the
Third Circuit have recognized that administrative and judicial func-
tions can and must be combined in order to preserve the substance
of the seventh amendment over various forms of procedure. 8
Nevertheless, in some cases, the courts have failed to recognize
that judicial intervention is necessary to guarantee fundamental
rights. In Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Day,'21 the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs in wage dispute actions before the National Rail-
way Adjustment Board'3' were limited to administrative relief with-
out judicial recourse either by way of original action or review. How-
ever, the majority failed even to consider the possibility of the denial
of the right to jury trial in holding that the Board had exclusive
primary jurisdiction over such disputes.13' Justice Black, dissenting,
criticized the majority for failing to go beyond the administrative
form to consider the nature of the rights and remedies involved. 3 He
recognized that the provision of the Railway Labor Act which allowed
'1 The Court in Lehigh recognized the importance of the distinction between legal
and equitable remedies with regard to the application of the seventh amendment:
It is one thing to enforce by injunction or mandatory process the lawful
ministerial order of the Commission, as to things to be done or not to
be done in futuro by defendant carriers in the conduct of their busi-
ness, and quite another thing to enforce an order for the payment of
damages by such carriers for a past violation of the law. The claim for
such damages . . . "presents a case at common law in which the
defendants are entitled to a jury trial," under the seventh amendment
to the Constitution.
Id. at 720. It is just this distinction between legal and equitable remedies that the
courts in Irey and Atlas Roofing failed to recognize in holding that the seventh amend-
ment is inapplicable to civil money penalties as enforced administratively. See note
82 supra.
'" In Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915), the
Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether the portion of § 16(2) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, which makes findings of the Commission prima facie evidence
of the facts at the trial de novo, infringes upon the right to jury trial. The Court held
that the prima facie rule "is a mere rule of evidence" which "does not abridge the right
of trial by jury or take away any of its incidents." Id. Thus, it appears that by uphold-
ing the trial de novo procedure as an effective guarantee of the seventh amendment
within the administrative process, the Court impliedly rejected the easier answer that
the right to jury trial does not apply to administrative proceedings.
'' 360 U.S. 548 (1959).
' The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(k) (1970), empowers the Board to
conduct hearings and make findings upon disputes between a carrier and its employ-
ees.
:31 360 U.S. at 554.
"' Id. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.
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a trial de novo with a jury was similar to the review provision in the
Interstate Commerce Act.'3 3 Black cited Western New York &
Pennsylvania Railway Co. v. Penn Refining Co. 34 and Lehigh Valley
Railway Co. v. Clark''13 in analogizing the right to jury trial in ICC
reparation proceedings to the administrative adjudication of a wage
dispute. 3 ' Since Congress had provided for a trial de novo in both
instances, Black rejected the more restrictive construction of the
Railway Labor Act provision which grants the de novo trial right only
to the railway and not to the aggrieved employee 37 and suggested that
the right be absolute to both parties. '38 However, the majority in Day
noted that an aggrieved employee is limited to administrative relief
unless the plaintiff brings an action at law for damages for improper
discharge.'30 Thus, while the Court seemingly ignored the plaintiff's
seventh amendment right in upholding the exclusive primary juris-
diction of the board, it permitted the employee to initiate an action
at law in which a jury trial could be obtained.
Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Irey, used an analysis similar to that
of Justice Black in Day in criticizing the majority for failing to apply
the seventh amendment to the administrative adjudication of a civil
money penalty. 40 Judge Gibbons noted that the majority, in consid-
ering what kinds of adjudication can be relegated by Congress to
executive branch employees, rather than jurors, simply accepted the
broad proposition that the seventh amendment is inapplicable to
administrative proceedings, thus completely foreclosing the right to
jury trial.'4' The Irey majority view appears contrary to the principle
"I Id. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970), provides for a review of
the decision of the Adjustment Board in district court and is similar to the Interstate
Commerce Commission procedure for review. See note 121 supra.
'' 137 F. 343 (3d Cir. 1905), aff'd 208 U.S. 208 (1908).
" 207 F. 717 (3d Cir. 1913), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 473 (1915).
'' 360 U.S. at 560.
, Id. at 558-63.
" Justice Black stated:
It would surely not be easy to uphold the constitutionality of a proce-
dure which takes away from both parties to a wage dispute their
ancient common-law right to trial by court and jury.
360 U.S. at 561-62 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 553.
519 F.2d at 1225.
Id. Judge Gibbons noted that the majority "has simply deferred to Congress'
labeling of the proceeding as 'administrative.'" See Note, Application of Constitu-
tional Guarantees of Jury Trial to the Administrative Process, 56 HARV. L. REV. 282,
283 (1942), in which the author suggests that refusing to grant a jury trial merely
CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES
which subordinates Congress' power where it denies fundamental
constitutional guarantees, such as the seventh amendment. 2 In fact,
Judge Gibbons noted that the majority failed to recognize this princi-
ple in allowing a statutorily-created administrative agency to deny
seventh amendment applicability. He reasoned that in an OSHA
adjudication of a civil money penalty, the Curtis-Pernell test required
application of the seventh amendment, since the matter involved a
legal right and remedy.13 The majority, in simply allowing Congress
to deny the jury trial right, refused to consider the nature of the right
and remedy involved. Such a failure by the Irey majority to consider
seventh amendment applicability, Judge Gibbons noted, ignored the
principle that Congress must observe the limitations on its power
imposed by the Constitution.'
In addition to Judge Gibbons' dissenting opinion, several com-
mentators reflect a similar constitutionally protective view in limit-
ing congressional authority where the deprivation of the right to jury
trial is at stake. Professor Moore apparently supports the meaning of
because a proceeding may be called "administrative," is an insufficient basis for deny-
ing the seventh amendment right.
112 See text accompanying notes 83-96 supra.
" 519 F.2d at 1225. Judge Gibbons seemingly adhered to the principle that the
seventh amendment preserves substance of right over form of procedure. See text
accompanying note 98 supra. See also Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv, L. REV. 1362 (1953),
in which Professor Hart foreshadowed the problem created by the Curtis-Pernell test
in light of administrative civil money penalties:
A. Well, the solid or apparently solid thing about Crowell [v. Ben-
son, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)] is the holding that administrative findings
of non-constitutional and non-jurisdictional facts may be made con-
clusive upon the courts, if not infected with any error of law, as a basis
for judicial enforcement of a money liability of one private person to
another.
Q. What's so surprising about that?
A. It's worth thinking about even as a matter of due process and
Article III judicial power. But stop and think particularly about the
Seventh Amendment.
Q. No right to jury trial in admiralty.
A. Good. But the Seventh Amendment hasn't been treated as stand-
ing in the way of the Crowell result even when the admiralty answer
wasn't available. Administrative proceedings haven't been regarded
as "suits at common law."
Q. My, the Seventh Amendment might have been a major safeguard
against bureaucracy with a little different interpretation, mightn't it?
Id. at 1375 (footnote omitted).
"1 519 F.2d at 1225. Judge Gibbons stated that "the limitations on the exercise
of federal power as set forth in the Constitution must. ., be observed by the legisla-
tive branch." Id.
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the Curtis-Pernell test, as it applies to administrative proceedings, in
suggesting that the seventh amendment limits Congress' power'45 and
in recognizing that the seventh amendment preserves substance of
right.'46 This suggests, as Judge Gibbons stated, that where the sev-
enth amendment applies, Congress must not deny its application by
creating a form of procedure in which a jury trial is impossible. The
Irey majority conceded that there was a limit to congressional power
where the seventh amendment was denied in the enforcement of tra-
ditional remedies,'47 but it observed no such limit in its complete
deference to Congress' authority. As Judge Gibbons pointed out, the
token reference to a limit by the majority is rendered hollow by the
Irey court's refusal to apply the jury trial right to the traditional
remedy of a money judgment."5 This failure to define a limit is con-
trary to Moore's recognition that, although Congress has broad au-
thority to establish various procedural modes for law, equity, and
admiralty jurisdiction, Congressional discretion is subject to the pro-
tective safeguards of the seventh amendment.'49 Louis Jaffe similarly
concludes that Congress is free to confer jurisdiction on an agency
without any recourse to the courts except where the issue is one
established as the subject of a suit at common law.' 0
Such a conclusion suggests that Judge Gibbons is correct in stat-
ing that where the Curtis-Pernel test establishes that a civil money
penalty falls under the mandate of the seventh amendment, Congress
cannot foreclose the right to jury trial by imposing an administrative
scheme without allowing a trial de novo. 5' An additional commenta-
'15 MOORE, supra note 11, T 38.11[3] at 115.
"' Id. 1 38.08[5] at 84.1.
,,7 519 F.2d at 1219.
"' Id. at 1221.
,' MOORE, supra note 11, T 38.08[21 at 52.
'" JAFFE, supra note 3, at 91. The author also notes that:
[Tihere is also the right of jury trial "in suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." Where it applies
it will, of course, exclude the use of an agency either as fact finder or
forum.
Id. at 90.
While Jaffe does not specifically mention the use of a trial de novo to satisfy the
seventh amendment guarantee in administrative adjudications, his statement that
recourse to the courts is necessary where the case involves a common law issue suggests
a trial by jury through a de novo provision.
"I See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), in which the Supreme
Court held the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims to be
Article III courts. In discussing the seventh amendment with regard to congressional
discretion to create various adjudication bodies, the Court implied that the common
CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES
tor'5 12 appears to concur with Judge Gibbons by stating that the legis-
lative intent of Congress is not the determinative factor of seventh
amendment applicability. Rather, he asserts that the legislature can-
not deprive the litigants of their constitutional right when a case falls
within the mandate of the seventh amendment. Fleming James also
supports the principle which limits Congress in its potential to subor-
dinate the jury trial right. He suggests that a suit in the nature of one
at common law poses a limit beyond which Congress cannot go in
denying the parties their seventh amendment guarantee.' 3
Finally, in addition to the constitutional limitation arguments,
there remains a consideration presented by the Supreme Court in
Ross v. Bernhard'4 for determining seventh amendment applicabil-
ity. The Court stated that if both the issue and the remedy were
previouely recognized at common law, then the right to jury trial
applied unless the practical limitations of the jury would prevent a
fair adjudication in the particular case.'55 While the historical tests
have been rejected,' 6 there appears to be some question as to the
adherence by the courts to the "abilities of the jury" test.'" Since the
applicability of the seventh amendment involves an important con-
stitutional guarantee, the courts have been reluctant to deny the jury
trial right merely on the basis of abilities and limitations of a jury.'58
law nature of the claim had a determinative effect even though the right might be
asserted in a legislative court:
[The legitimacy of that nonjury mode of trial does not depend upon
the supposed "legislative" character of the court. It derives instead
• . .from the fact that suits against the Government are not "suits
at common law" within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment.
Id. at 572.
' Lazor, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases-Constitutionally
Mandated?, 53 TEXAs L. REV. 483, 489 (1975).
"2 James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1963).
However, the author uses the historical test, which has since been rejected. See text
accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
':' 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
Id. at 538 n.10.
' See text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
': Some commentators have suggested that the Ross test be ignored. Note, Ross
v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112, 129-
33 (1971). One commentator states that the Supreme Court in Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), ignored the Ross "abilities and limitations" test. Lazor,
Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases-Constitutionally Mandated?, 53
TEXAS L. REV. 483, 494 (1975).
'1 See Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
852 (1971), in which the court refused to find that a patent infringement suit was too
complex or esoteric for the jury, holding that any such determination "must come from
the Supreme Court." Id.
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However, regardless of the acceptance by the courts of the Ross test,
it appears that even if it were applied to the imposition of a civil
money penalty, the test would not require the denial of the seventh
amendment. The subject matter involved in an OSHA penalty pro-
ceeding seems appropriate for a jury and furthermore, has been held
to be proper for jury determination.' 9
CONCLUSION
Under the Curtis-Pernell test for seventh amendment applicabil-
ity, the right to a jury trial depends upon the nature of the rights and
remedies involved. Where the rights and remedies are legal in nature,
as in the case of a civil money penalty, the seventh amendment
guarantee applies. Where a civil money penalty has been administra-
tively imposed, some courts have denied the jury trial right by
unquestioning adherence to the general principle that the seventh
amendment is inapplicable to administrative proceedings. However,
that general doctrine is based upon precedent which has involved the
adjudication of equitable matters and is inapplicable to civil money
penalties, which are legal. Furthermore, Congress cannot nullify the
seventh amendment merely by arbitrarily classifying administrative
proceedings as equitable. Constitutional guarantees have historically
been afforded maximum protection and should not be denied where
applicable. Indeed, Congress has seen fit in the past to accommodate
the administrative process where the seventh amendment guarantee
has been infringed by providing for a trial de novo. The right to jury
trial is a fundamental guarantee which withstands the criticism of
administrative efficiency. A jury trial can easily be engrafted upon
the administrative process for assessment of civil money penalties by
the trial de novo procedure. Such a procedure guarantees the parties
their full exercise of the right to jury trial in the established frame-
work of administrative' and judicial cooperation.
RUSSELL L. HEWiT
WILLIAM P. WALLACE, JR.
' United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974). See Farmers-
Peoples Bank v. United States, 477 F.2d 752, 757 (6th Cir. 1973), where the court,
applying the Ross test, held that questions involving personal liability were "peculiarly
appropriate for jury resolution." Id. The matters for the jury in that case were not
unlike the issues in an OSHA penalty proceeding which involve questions of "re-
peated" or "serious" violations as well as an imposition of money liability, see 29
U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
